well-developed literature has emerged in the last few decades analyzing these two modes (as well as some "hybrid" modes), and considering why one mode might be used in some circumstances, and the other in different circumstances.
3 A more recent, but rapidly growing, literature has explored how globalization seems to be leading to more "outsourcing," in which activities that were once carried on within a single firm are now being organized by contracts, across multiple firms, perhaps in multiple countries. 4 Nearly all of the economic literature on choice of organizational form, globalization, and the "outsourcing" phenomenon, however, assumes the existence of an institutional context in which rule of law is followed, minimum social standards and business norms are established and regulated (or are at least commonly accepted and followed within a given trade), and contracts can be enforced. 5 Given these characteristics of the institutional context, two firms that both operate in the United States or other developed counties, for example, can focus in their contracts with each other on the terms on which the subject of the contract will be carried out, without having to worry much about baseline or "default" terms. If firm A hires firm B to clean its offices and facilities, for example, A will not have to specify that B may not use child labor, may not dump its waste products in the municipal water system, and may not kidnap A's 4 A variety of terms have been used by economists to refer to the phenomenon of outsourcing, including "vertical specialization," "intra-product specialization," and "global production sharing." For excellent starting points to explore this literature, see Gene M. (1998) . 5 Certainly some of the international trade literature recognizes that the quality of foreign enforcement of contracts is an important factor in expaining whether a firm relies on international outsourcing to procure specialized inputs, rather than production within the firm, either domestically or through vertical integration. See Barbara J. Spencer, International Outsourcing and Incomplete Contracts, NBER Working Paper 11418 (2005) , available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w11418 (last visited Mar. 14, 2007) . This literature focuses on the institutional conditions under which a country can attact global firms to enter into outsourcing contracts in that country, rather than focusing on decisions within the firm, as does the law and economics theory of the firm literature that we are describing here.
economics has considered the standard problems of coordination, communication, and incentive structures in the "make or buy" decision. 9 In the latter case, the literature has generally assumed that various parties contract with each other "in the shadow of the law." 10 There is also a relevant literature on the development, outside the law, of norms, reputational constraints, and arbitration mechanisms that may substitute for law in some circumstances.
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In this article we examine the rapid emergence and expansion of a private-sector compliance and enforcement infrastructure that we believe may increasingly be providing a substitute for public legal and regulatory infrastructure in global commerce, especially in developing countries where rule of law is weak and court systems are absent or inadequate. This infrastructure is provided by a proliferation of performance codes and standards (some developed in collaborative processes by non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and business), and a rapidly-growing global army of privately-trained and authorized inspectors and certifiers that we call the "third-party assurance industry."
Third-party assurance in some form or another has been used to facilitate commerce for centuries. 12 But its growth in very recent years has been phenomenal. 13 legitimacy of these new law-making regimes according to such fundamental values of democracy as accountability, transparency, consent, and participation of the governed. 9 See Klein, Crawford & Alchian, supra note 3. 10 HIST (1989) . 12 The earliest use of third party assurance services may have been the role played by several "boards of state accountants" in verifying state revenues and expenditures in ancient Athens, 500 to 300 B.C. See
Moreover, whereas the third-party assurance business first developed to facilitate the making and carrying out of private contracts, we claim that the activities of the assurance industry are rapidly being deployed for purposes that in the past would be considered "public" and "regulatory" in nature, and would previously have been left to the authority of government. Third-party assurance may thus be providing a substitute for both private and public law in a number of situations, and may even be providing a new institutional structure through which private commercial exchange may be regulated for essentially public purposes.
We examine the new prominence of this industry in international commerce and the reasons why it has exploded onto the scene in the last decade. We also consider whether the rapid deployment of third-party assurance in business is facilitating the transmission of global norms of acceptable business behavior to new parts of the world, or whether, by providing a substitute for law, it is undermining the indigenous development of sophisticated legal systems.
I. The third party assurance industry and evidence of its growth.
Perhaps the most familiar type of third-party assurance service is the external auditor, who examines financial statements and the processes by which they were generated, and opines on whether the statements fairly and accurately reflect the underlying economic reality. 14 Independent external auditors have been critical to the . 13 See section I below for evidence of an explosion in recent years in demand for third-party assurance services, as well as for the development of quantifiable performance metrics by which such services can measure and report on performance by parties to actual and potential contracts. 14 According to the Global Market Information Database by Euromonitor International, the size of the US market for accountants' services has grown by 9.6% from 2000 to 2004, measured in the dollar value of development of liquid financial markets in which individuals may invest in market-traded securities issued by the businesses with reasonable confidence that the information the company has provided is an accurate reflection of the condition of the underlying business.
Financial institutions that invest in or insure business ventures have also long made use of other kinds of assurance services, in addition to financial audits. The business of assuring and attesting to non-financial matters began at least 150 years ago, for example, when marine insurance companies in France, Britain, and Italy began hiring inspectors to make sure that ships being hired for international commerce were seaworthy. 15 And financial institutions generally, including insurance companies and lending institutions, continue to be among the most active users of a variety of third-party assurance services.
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A. In 1987, the ISO embarked on a significant new path when it adopted the "ISO 9000" standards of quality management. 18 These were the first sets of international standards that applied to management systems that firms have in place to meet customer and applicable regulatory requirements, rather than to the characteristics of the products firms produce or to units and methods of measuring those characteristics. 19 Although certification is not a requirement of the ISO standards, many firms have chosen to have their systems independently audited and certified to them, 20 and certification rapidly "became a de facto requirement for doing business in Europe and other parts of the 17 "ISO", from the Greek word for "equal," was adopted as the "standardized" name for the organization whose English name is the International Organization for Standardization. ISO is a non-governmental organization whose member institutes are part of the governmental structure of their countries, or are mandated by their government. Typically, however, members have their roots in the private sector, having been set up by national partnerships of industry associations. ISO uses technical committees organized by subjects for standards development, and at this time has more than 200 such committees. Since its founding in 1947, ISO has published more than 16,000 product, technical, and performance standards for the characteristics and quality of raw materials and other tangible production inputs, ranging from agricultural products, grades of oil and gasoline, metals, ceramics and glues to electrical parts, nanotechnology, information processing, digital equipment, and so forth.. The ISO 9000 idea of creating standards for management systems has greatly fueled the development of the assurance industry. 22 The organizations that were first qualified to certify ISO 9000 compliance were generally European organizations that
were already providing quality inspection services for various products; more recently, accounting and audit firms have been expanding their business services portfolios to add capability to perform ISO 9000 certifications. ). However, most of the certification bodies providing ISO9000 certification, including BVQI, UL, SGS-ICS, and the like, were already in the quality inspection services sector when the ISO 9000 standards were developed and promulgated. 24 See http://www.iso.org/iso/en/iso9000-14000/pdf/survey10thcycle.pdf; at p. 15. 25 See http://www.iso.org/iso/en/prods-services/otherpubs/pdf/survey2004.pdf, at p. 10.
Once the demand for management quality certification had developed sufficiently to support a private sector infrastructure to certify management systems, it was only a small step for business, government, NGOs, and social activists to look to these same sorts of certifying organizations to provide assurance when asking companies to demonstrate that they are meeting specified criteria for social performance. 26 In 1996, the ISO adopted the ISO 14000 series of standards for evaluating environmental management systems. 27 By 2004, 90,569 facilities and firms, in 127 countries, had been certified as meeting these standards. 28 And ISO is currently developing standards for social responsibility as well, although ISO asserts that these standards are not intended to be the basis for third-party certifications.
29 26 The American National Standards Institute (which is the U.S. organizational representative to the ISO) notes growing pressures toward social performance certification on its website. See http://www.ansi.org/about_ansi/introduction/history.aspx?menuid=1 ("During the first years of the 21st Century, those involved in standards-setting activities clearly recognized a growing need for globally relevant standards and related conformity assessment mechanisms. 'Market forces' such as global trade and competition; societal issues such as health, safety and the environment; an enhanced focus on consumer needs and involvement and increasing interaction between public-sector and private-sector interests were significantly impacting standardization and conformity assessment programs. Standards themselves had expanded well beyond documents identifying product specifications to instead focus on performance issues and to also include processes, systems and personnel.") 27 There is a range of many different opinions as to the right approach ranging from strict legislation at one end to complete freedom at the other. We are looking for a golden middle way that promotes respect and responsibility based on known reference documents without stifling creativity and development.
"Our work will aim to encourage voluntary commitment to social responsibility and will lead to common guidance on concepts, definitions and methods of evaluation.
"The need for organizations in both public and private sectors to behave in a socially responsible way is becoming a generalized requirement of society. 
C. The "professionalization" of the inspection industry.
The assurance business is itself largely unregulated, and there are no wellestablished and well-accepted training procedures or professional standards for those who "audit" non-financial performance indicators. Yet, by its nature it is a business that is rife with potential for abuse. This is because, as is true for financial audits, inspections and evaluations of systems and operating practices are usually arranged and purchased by a supplier company in order to provide assurance to a purchasing company that the supplier has met contract terms, or complied with certain norms and standards. And, as is true in the business of providing financial audits, individual auditors might have incentives to accept payoffs in exchange for approval by the auditors. Likewise, the client firms whose facilities are being audited might have incentives to offer such payoffs if it is cheaper for them to make the side payments than it is to comply with the codes or standards. Indeed, factory owners in developing countries who are being asked by their developed-country customers to subject themselves to audit, frequently complain that the demands for audits are a form of extortion. Other scholars have written at length about the growth in international commerce in the last few decades, 35 and the extent to which corporations in developed countries now contract with developing country firms for parts manufacturing, assembly, testing, and even sales (e.g., call centers) and record-keeping. 36 When products are made in factories owned by, and under the immediate supervision of managerial employees of a large firm, that firm can directly implement its own quality, timely delivery, labor, and environmental operating norms and standards. When the same firm contracts with a factory owner in Bangladesh, or Vietnam, or Costa Rica to make the products, the parties to the contract will probably need to develop alternative mechanisms, other than direct managerial control, to make certain that the products are still made according to the hiring firm's specifications (both as to product characteristics and quality, and as to the 35 The international trade literature in particular tracks this growth. processes used). These mechanisms may range from the hiring firm having its own inspectors in the contractor's plant at all times, to having third party inspectors check the plant's operations from time to time, to relying solely on inspection of the final product at the time the hiring firm takes possession of it. This last mechanism may be widely-used for simple commodity-type products made in uncontroversial ways. But, as we discuss below, such products represent a decreasing share of total trade.
B. The growing complexity of products and increased division of labor within supply chains.
More of the products being exchanged between firms in international markets are intermediate products that must meet strict specifications as inputs or components of other products, or are made utilizing processes that are controversial (e.g., strip mining, farming with patented seeds and fertilizers and pest control chemicals, or labor-intensive assembly potentially involving sweatshop conditions or child labor). 37 It is common, for example, for products to be designed in one country, components to be purchased from suppliers in other countries, assembly work done in yet another country, all for shipment to markets in a number of other countries. . 38 See Grossman & Helpman, supra note 13, at 136. Quoting an example from the 1998 Annual Report of the WTO concerning the production of a particular "American" car, Grossman and Helpman state:
Thirty per cent of the car's value goes to Korea for assembly, 17.5% to Japan for components and advanced technology, 7.5% to Germany for design, 4% to Taiwan and Singapore for minor parts, 2.5% to the United Kingdom for advertising and marketing services and 1.5% to Ireland for data processing. This means that only 37% of the production value …is generated in the United States (p.36)).
At each step of the way, the corporations that are organizing all of this productive activity need to be able to control for quality, conformance to specifications, timely delivery of intermediate products to final assembly plants, and safety in both the manufacturing and use of the product. Throughout this process, inventories must be managed for cost-efficiency, and to provide required levels of customer service. 39 For such products, the purchasing company may have compelling reason to want to monitor steps in the production process in one way or another.
C. The growing need by global corporations for assurance that firms they are contracting with can meet requirements for quality, and timely delivery.
The surge in demand from global corporations for third party assurance has grown out of the need on the part of global buyers to be sure that, if they were going to outsource an activity to smaller, less-experienced firms in distant countries, those firms could meet quality standards and timely delivery commitments. That need was the impetus for the development of the ISO 9000 standards for assuring that organizations could meet product quality expectations, discussed above. 40 The growth of the third-party assurance industry based on ISO standard-setting was further fueled by developments in the regulation of international trade. social and environmental standards is being driven partly by pressure on companies by some investors. Certain sectors of the investment community, such as public pension funds and self-described "SRI investors" (for "socially responsible investors") in the EU, UK and US, and insurance investors in the UK, are increasingly looking at the social and environmental performance of their portfolio companies and those companies' trading partners in an attempt to identify risks associated with the portfolio firms as well as their trading partners out in the supply chain. 46 This development, in turn, is causing corporations in developing countries that may be suppliers to more well-known global corporations to insist that their suppliers, in turn, also meet certain standards.
In this way, multinational firms may be drawing more small and local firms in more countries into their orbit. As this happens, we are observing a movement toward global standard setting and the associated use of third-party assurance firms to certify that standards are being met, even by supplier firms that still operate and sell primarily in their home country. 47 As we discuss at greater length below, we suspect this chain of the services they offer to assist corporations in meeting so-called "corporate social responsibility" (CSR) norms and standards Global corporations are also more inclined in the last two decades to insist that suppliers, as well as their own facilities, meet certain social standards because they recognize that each link in the supply chain potentially exposes the whole operation to risks associated with that link. Similarly, firms that use highly labor-intensive manufacturing and assembly processes, such as apparel and toy manufacturers, have responded to media attacks on firms whose products were allegedly made in "sweatshop" conditions 56 by developing codes of practice for their own factories and for supplier factories. But these firms have also learned that announcing codes of practice is not sufficient to solve the problem 57 -they must also develop implementation strategies and arrange for inspection and certification to be sure the codes are in fact implemented.
To enhance brand protection by tackling the implementation problem in one industry, for example, a group of corporations in the apparel and "sewn products" safety and human rights performance standards to be applied at the factory level, and to implement inspection and certification procedures. 59 WRAP is now formally an independent non-profit organization, governed by a board of directors of which, by the organization's bylaws, more than half must be unaffiliated with the apparel industry.
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Factory certification by WRAP requires that the facilities meet initial standards, as certified by an approved independent monitor, and be subject to unannounced audits, and annual renewal. 61 The awareness of supply-chain risks is amplified by recognition on the part of corporations and their investors that a large share of the economic value that firms create is tied to their "brand value." 62 But, as discussed above, brand value is only as good as its weakest link because expansion in international travel and communications makes it harder for firms to hide their "dirty laundry." Wal-Mart, for example, has undertaken a massive public-relations campaign, including drawing attention to its new code of ethics, to attempt to respond to critics who charge that its suppliers violate international labor 59 The first result of the AAMA initiative was the twelve Worldwide Responsible Apparel Production Principles --standards of labor practices, factory conditions, and environmental and customs compliance. The AAMA Board of Directors publicly endorsed these principles in 1998. For the next two years, the Association worked with producers, public interest groups, and development agencies to "design a process and develop an organization to monitor and certify factories for compliance-in hundreds of details-with the principles. 64 The activism of NGOs is accompanied by a proliferation of social and environmental responsibility standards over the past ten years,. These initiatives have been developed by states; public/private partnerships; multi-stakeholder negotiation processes; industries and companies; institutional investors; functional groups such as accountancy firms and social assurance consulting groups (many of which did not exist more than about five years ago); NGOs; and non-financial ratings agencies. 65 One example (among many) is Social Accountability 8000 ("SA 8000"), a project of Social Accountability International. SA 8000 is an auditable certification standard based on international labor and human rights standards.
66 SA8000 also provides a social accountability management system to guide firms in implementing standards and to demonstrate ongoing conformance with the standards. In particular, to 64 72 The development of codes and standards and the increasing expectation that global firms take responsibility for implementing and enforcing these standards throughout their supply chains have greatly expanded the role of third-party assurance in global business, even though demand for quality, speed, timely-delivery and cost control may have provided the initial impetus for this expansion.
E. The growing demands for transparency (as well as quality and social responsibility).
Institutional investor networks are also asking for improved quality and quantity of information from their portfolio companies. 
III. An examination of these developments: China as a case study
In both the short run, and possibly in the long run, the developments surveyed above point toward a rapidly developing shift in the sources of regulatory authority towards private standard setting, 86 and private enforcement through inspection, monitoring and certification services by third party assurance service organizations. The increasing reliance by global corporations on third party assurance services in lieu of either direct control of production in facilities owned by the corporations, or court enforcement of contracts entered into with locally-owned businesses, raises questions about how corporations may be influencing the development of law and legal institutions 83 Business people who are under pressure to meet numerous different codes and standards may also begin to support regulation and enforcement by local governments to avoid multiple inspections and fees and possibly conflicting standards. Moreover, once some businesses are required to meet higher standards, they often find that it is in their interest that the same regulatory requirements be imposed on their competitors. For these reasons we might expect that widespread use of third party assurance services to help implement business norms and enforce contracts will hasten the movement toward rule of law.
On the other hand, to the extent that private-sector arrangements provide a satisfactory substitute for government-provided local legal institutions, they may take pressure off governments to build independent uncorrupted legal institutions, and thereby slow down the movement toward rule of law. For example, some critics of efforts by
NGOs to act as watchdogs in enforcing agreements about labor protections in factories have argued that local governments are "ceding some of their sovereignty to consumers" and that NGOs may thereby "ultimately undermine traditional regulatory processes." Whether we observe either outcome is likely to vary from country, to country. It may also vary as between enforcing contract terms having to do with quality and timely delivery, versus enforcing terms established to meet social performance expectations. 88 We do not have clear answers to these questions yet, but a telling case is the debate currently under way among Chinese factory owners, their corporate customers from developed countries, human rights and labor advocates, and Chinese government officials about whether Chinese firms should accept standards imposed on them by outsiders and submit to private third-party inspectors to ensure those standards are met.
China's case is interesting because the emergence of a network of firms attempting to do inspection and certification work in China was initially driven by the demand by developed country apparel firms and retailers that supplier firms in China meet social standards, especially for workplace safety and fair labor practices. But it is now rapidly spreading to other industries, and, more importantly, the Chinese appear to be trying to take responsibility themselves for creating social standards and for certifying that factories meet those standards.
The story of China's amazing rush to industrialize and compete in the global economy in the last two decades is now fairly well known. China began opening up its markets and encouraging production of goods for foreign markets in the 1980s, and by the mid-to late-1990s had become one of the world's largest suppliers of textile and apparel products, toys, and other labor-intensive, relatively low-technology products.
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Early on in this process, little attention was paid either by Chinese factory managers or by 88 The latter may also be imposed on local firm suppliers through compliance clauses in contracts with global customers. 89 It was also rapidly becoming a supplier of more technologically-intensive products, but apparel products and toys were the first industries where global corporations began trying to impose social responsibility requirements on the Chinese suppliers.
their global customers to how such products were made. Buyers were focused mainly on price, delivery speed, quality, and reliability. These are factors that buyers can observe for themselves with simple goods like apparel and toys, and they consequently did not worry about the conditions under which the products were being made.
By the early 1990s, however, the international press began writing stories about the appalling conditions in factories where branded products were being made. 90 By 1995 and 1996, a few high-visibility corporations, including Nike, The Gap, and Kathy Lee Gifford's apparel line for Wal-Mart, were being targeted relentlessly by news reports and social activists for operating sweatshops in developing countries. In response, some firms adopted their own codes of practice for their vendors. including SA 8000, WRAP, and ICTII (toy manufacturers) and some codes developed internally by certain large buyers.
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Just telling factories that they must meet certain standards does not make it happen in practice, however. 94 The mechanism that global customers have used to pressure supplier factories to meet standards is the requirement in their contracts with
Chinese companies that the factories be inspected and certified either by inspectors from the buyer corporation, or by third party inspectors and certifiers. 95 The initial reaction of Chinese manufacturing companies (as well as some
Chinese scholars, policy analysts and businessmen) to customer pressures to meet social standards such as SA8000 was surprise, hostility to the standards, and panic because meeting the standards would require higher costs and make it more difficult, factory owners believed, for Chinese firms to win contracts with big buyers. as to charge that the requirement was a new form of non-tariff barrier, 97 a protectionist measure designed to "undercut competitiveness of developing countries." 98 For reasons that aren't entirely clear, the SA8000 certification program has been the most controversial and in the last few years, in fact, has become a lightning rod for widespread resentment and distrust among owners and operators of Chinese facilities that are asked to meet the standards by their big-name global customers.
Chinese critics of social responsibility standards have further challenged the purpose of the SA8000 requirements on the grounds that few facilities in developed countries have been required to meet SA8000 standards, and that, while SA8000 requires that certified facilities must protect freedom of association, the rate of unionization in the United States, where SA8000 standards were developed, is very low. 99 And critics have expressed resentment about meeting SA8000 requirements because the SA8000 process is costly, often requiring that fees be paid to certification bodies not only for the certification itself, but for consulting assistance required to meet the standards. It is widely believed in China that the high consulting fees are products of the unregulated certification markets. 100 Moreover, the unwillingness of buyer corporations to absorb the additional cost of meeting social standards, plus the lack of training and unprofessional behavior by auditors for the certifying firms, have led Chinese firms to believe that the certification process is not taken seriously by buyer firms, and, in practice, certification is more or less an extortion scheme, in which certifying organizations will certify manufacturing facilities that adequately pay off the certifier. 101 Not surprisingly, some
Chinese suppliers have found ways to falsify their records and satisfy the auditors with superficial changes.
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Participants in the debate over SA 8000 in China have also charged that, while imposition of social accountability standards by multinational companies may please the customers of those companies, this amounts to "value imperialism" by western society.
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Factories that supply products for China's domestic market are not being required to meet similar standards, they note. The reality behind this complaint, however, is more complicated. China's own labor protection laws are in fact very similar to the requirements of SA8000, though, in practice, they are typically not enforced for lack of resources and other factors. 104 By contrast, multinational firms with the help of the inspection/certification firms, can enforce the SA8000 requirements, by threatening to cancel orders if plants fail to meet standards as reported by the certifying firms. 105 This suggests that the multinational corporations who are insisting on third party inspection to enforce social norms in Chinese factories are, in fact, merely implementing standards that China's own leaders have articulated in Chinese law.
Moreover, recent developments in China suggest that resistance to the social performance standards implied by SA 8000 and other internationally imposed standards may be softening, that China may even be moving to embrace and implement such standards on their own. One surprising development is the fact that job growth in the industrial regions of China has actually exceeded the pace at which potential workers are 104 The contents of SA8000 are not very different from the requirements of China's labor law. SA8000 provides criteria for limiting child labor or forced labor, for health and safety standards, for freedom of association and rights to collective bargaining, prohibiting discrimination, identifying permissible discipline, defining working hours, compensation and management systems. flowing into those regions from rural areas, creating some actual shortages of skilled or experienced labor in some areas. 106 The shortages are blamed in part on "low wages and poor working conditions," 107 but may also be due to migration policies in China designed to slow the movement of people out of the countryside into the urban industrial centers. 108 The second development is the growing unrest in China over the widening gap between rich and poor, between interior areas and coastal regions, as well as between urban and rural regions, and the dissatisfaction of lower-income groups over low pay and the appalling standards at factories that serve only domestic markets. 109 These two factors have led China's own working classes and intellectual elite to begin demanding that factories that serve only the domestic market should also be required to meet higher standards for safety and worker protection.
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In response to these problems, there has been a subtle change in attitude toward "corporate social responsibility" standards among scholars, officials, and the general public in China. For example, derogatory words such as "stick" (Da Bang), and "nontariff barrier" are being used less frequently. 111 Moreover, the Chinese central Chinese characteristics. CSC9000T is described as a management model based on a "Plan-Do-Check-Act" system. "Check" means evaluating systems of production, identifying problems and finding solutions. The process is aided by third party evaluation organizations. The evaluation reports by the third party organizations are subject to the final approval by the Responsible Supply Chain Association (RSCA), which is a group of 114 According to the Chinese language version of the website regarding CSC 9000T, the numbering system for these corporate behavior and certification models is intended to imitate ISO14000. companies doing business in China with a commitment to CSC9000T. Firms then develop plans to address problems identified in the evaluation, and their efforts to implement these plans will eventually be rated by the third party evaluation organization.
The ratings are either defensive, complaint, managerial, strategic or civil. It is claimed by the CSC9000T that these ratings are basically the five stages of constructing corporate social responsibility. The evaluation reports and ratings will not be available to the public, however. According to the CSC9000T Principles, a firm can demonstrate its compliance with the CSC Principles to its stakeholders, buyers or other third parties by voluntarily disclosing the results of the evaluation, but that is not a required part of the process.
RSCA is, in principle, responsible for ensuring the independence of the so-called Substantively, CSC9000T is more like ISO14000 than SA8000 with regard to the underlying philosophy being used. That is, the standards set forth in the CSC9000T are long-term goals or commitments rather than immediately applicable substantive standards. CSC9000T is a management tool to help a firm manage its social responsibility risk, as well as improve its performance, rather than a standard by which to certify performance. The function of the CSC9000T is said to be to promote continual improvement in labor protection, without an explicit substantive end-point that has been defined. Procedurally, CSC9000T provides for "third party evaluation organizations," but these organizations' functions are limited and their independence is questionable.
RSCA controls the process, from deciding the eligibility of evaluating organizations and monitoring the process of evaluations to approving the actual reports that the evaluators generate. Since the members of the RSCA are the same firms that are subject to CSC9000T evaluation -Chinese domestic companies -there is the obvious potential for conflicts of interest, and for the process to be used to promote the appearance but not the reality of improving labor and other social conditions. Moreover, since the evaluation reports and ratings will not be available to the public, the pressure from buyers in the supply chain may still be the only mechanism for ensuring these firms actually improve their labor standards. And, so far as we can tell, there are no global customers accepting CSC9000T evaluations instead of certification to SA8000, or WRAP, or to the customers' codes of conduct.
What effect of CSC9000T will have on the development of law and norms in China is not yet known, of course, and it is too soon to be entirely confident about its likely effect. While CSC9000T does not, in principle, have the force of law, it may nonetheless be useful in helping local government officials develop the capacity to evaluate manufacturing facilities. To the extent that CSC9000T embodies the existing requirements of Chinese law, it would be appropriate for local governments to develop this capability. In fact, local government officials might well view the development of CSC9000T by the quasi-official National Textile and Apparel Council as encouragement from China's central government for them to be more proactive in enforcing existing law.
To the extent that such evaluations generate income (from inspection fees, for example, or perhaps from fines for violations of legal codes), local governments may have a financial incentive to become more proactive in enforcing labor law as written.
IV. Theoretical and policy implications.
This article bridges two previously distinct fields of law, one that has to do with the institutions and mechanisms by which private contracts are drafted and enforced, and the other which has to do with how corporate behavior is policed, especially in the international arena.
A. The contractual role of third party assurance. On the contract side, the role being played by third-party assurance in global commerce can be understood as a mechanism for solving a number of common contracting problems.
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First, we can think of the relationship between a manufacturing firm in a developing country and a global corporation that contracts to buy the output of the manufacturer as an "agency" relationship, in which the manufacturer is making specialized goods on behalf of the global corporation. In any agency relationship we would expect to find problems arising from "asymmetric information" (The agent has knowledge about his performance that the principal does not have.) and from misalignment of incentives (The agent doesn't always have an incentive to perform in a way that is in the principal's best interest.). Second, contracts between global corporation and a developing country supplier may inevitably be incomplete in some ways. 119 In parts of the world where legal systems are well-developed, contracting parties can have access to courts if they get into a dispute about some aspect of the relationship, and courts can generally be relied upon to decide the dispute by imputing terms that may be missing in the formal contract. If courts are regarded by both parties to the contract as neutral, independent and reasonably sophisticated, the parties are likely to be comfortable with this approach to dispute resolution. But where contracting parties do not have a high level of confidence in courts of law, we might expect to find alternative arrangements that involve appeals to neutral, but sophisticated third parties such as arbitrators and assurance firms. Recognizing this issue, China, for example, established a quasi-governmental organization, CIETAC, 119 We will not even attempt to summarize that work here, and will certainly not cite all the scholarship on the subject. But see Hart and Holmstrom, supra note 118, for a useful discussion of the implications of incomplete contracts. One might expect that the same institutional arrangements that make a contract "self-enforcing" might also be used extensively to govern business relationships when enforcement authorities are weak, corrupt, or unsophisticated. An alternative, however, might be for the contracting parties to develop systems of private contract enforcement, such as agreements to rely on the assessments of third party inspectors and verifiers for a determination of whether contract terms were satisfied. It appears to us that this is what is happening now in many contexts around the world. In the interaction between global corporations and local firms in developing countries, the parties may, in effect be importing resources for private law enforcement to interpret contract terms and determine whether they have been met.
Third-part assurance firms may thus supply certain contract facilitating and enforcing functions in developing countries that might be supplied by formal legal 121 See e.g., Douglass North, supra note 7; Donald C. "regulation by non-regulation (laissez-faire), through formal self-regulation (such as by some industry associations), hybrid private-private regulation (for example, business-NGO partnerships in the Fair Labor Association), hybrid public-private regulation (for instance, in mutual recognition arrangements where a private agency in one country tests products to certify compliance with governmental standards of another country), network governance by state officials (as in the work of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) on environmental policies to be followed by national export credit agencies), inter-governmental organizations with direct governance powers (as with determinations by the Office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees of individuals' refugee status, or the WTO dispute resolution system for trade conflicts). 126 The phenomenon we study in this paper points to an emerging alternative mechanism of regulation that is tied to private contractual relationships. As we noted above, global, branded companies are exposed to ever greater risks as their supply chains lengthen, as production is moved outside of the firm, and as companies increasingly
come under pressure to demonstrate that the conditions of production in their supply chains meet international standards. Given these pressures, companies are including "regulatory" standards for health, safety, conditions of employment and environmental management in their supply-chain contracts, 127 and then engaging various certifying organizations to provide assurance that the standards have been met.
Thus, the role being played by third-party assurance may be a merging of private law contractual mechanisms for organizing production with public law activities of standard setting and enforcement. 126 Kingsbury et al., supra note 8, at 2. 127 Supply contracts are usually confidential and not accessible to the public. Certain companies' contracts are filed as part of their annual or quarterly securities reports, however, and thus available in the EDGARPlus(R) database of LexisNexis. By using the keywords "supplier code of conduct" and "material contract," we found companies, such as Tommy Hilfiger Corp. 
V. Conclusions.
We have suggested in this paper that a new private sector mechanism is emerging and operating globally that may provide a substitute for law and formal legal structures both in contract enforcement and in policing the social behavior of firms. The third-party assurance industry, which came to sudden prominence in international commerce in recent years initially to provide expert evaluations of product qualities for purposes of enforcing private contracts, is now being deployed globally to implement and enforce social standards. In the process, the activities of these organizations may be having the effect of promulgating international business norms and standards of human rights, labor protection, and social responsibility.
Even where local law as written is consistent with such international standards (such as seems to be true at least for labor protection in China), third party assurance provides an enforcement mechanism would otherwise be lacking in many countries.
Moreover, as we have seen in the Chinese case study, importing international standards and private sector enforcers may have the effect of hastening the development of formal legal institutions that have the potential to implement and enforce for those standards. This is clearly not the only possible interpretation of these developments.
Commercial interests have long established parallel institutions for the arbitration of commercial disputes that do not depend on local judicial systems, and do not necessarily have any positive effect on those judicial systems. 128 Some commentators have even suggested that arbitration of commercial disputes can undermine public law developments by allowing firms to contract around public law, even the laws of developed economies such as the EU or US. 129 So we recognize the need for us to do further theoretical work to determine what aspects of "rule of law" are more amenable to influence by the developments described in this paper, and then test those theories by evaluating in detail the effect that strengthening commercial substitutes for local judicial enforcement has on public judicial and legal establishments.
We want to know more, for example, about the political dynamic that has given rise to, and that is now responding to third party assurance regimes as enforcers of social standards. It seems likely, for example, that the new Chinese social responsibility standard, CSC9000T, will not replace third party assurance unless foreign buyers treat a CSC9000T evaluation as the substantial equivalent of an audit and certification, to a
Western standard or code of conduct, by an independent third party. For the reasons identified above, however, foreign buyers will undoubtedly be cautious about embracing CSC9000T-in significant part because it neither provides public acknowledgement nor credible assurance that suppliers have actually met acceptable social standards for production.
This suggests an interesting Catch-22 for NGOs, activists, business people and financial institutions who want to see social and political reform in developing countries. but may be consistent with the protections some Chinese political reformers and intellectuals advocate. In some enterprises, such as toys, apparel and sports equipment manufacturers, for example, it appears to us that the existence of external pressures from foreign buyers has allowed some Chinese citizens greater degree of freedom so that they have been able to advocate for reforms such as expanded labor rights and better human rights protection. 130 To the extent that participants in and around Chinese enterprise participate in developing business norms and social assurance standards and procedures modeled on Western variants, then, they are essentially engaging in type of political action in a context that is likely to be less threatening to the government than other types of political activity. Such a development may ultimately be a powerful lever for political liberalization in China.
Of course it may also be that China's experience is atypical. While it is certainly the case that the assurance service business has grown dramatically in size and in importance in China in the last decade, it has also become extremely important around the world, from Mexico to India to Thailand and Vietnam, to Turkey and Eastern Europe and South Africa. And, just as in China, the industry seems to be playing both a contract enforcement role, and a role in introducing and enforcing social norms and standards wherever it is operating. We are unaware, however, of local governments outside of China that are attempting to create their own regulatory and inspection regimes in response to the activities of the private sector assurance organizations. These are all questions that await further research. 130 In interviews of company executives in large retail firms in the United States with responsibility for supply chain management, conducted with Prof. John Conley as part of projects to explore the CSR trend in business, we have heard this point made: that by coming in with their CSR requirements, companies give Chinese managers and government officials who want reform a safe rationale to use to argue for such reform. See Conley & Williams, supra note 65, at 8, fn. 49 for a description of the research methodology.
